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Abstract
This paper provides a general framework for a unifying treatment of stochastic dominance
of any degree and of any type (direct or inverse for each ﬁnal or intermediary level). It gives
the conditions for the congruence between stochastic dominance and classes of utility functions
in this general framework and shows, as particular cases, the properties of some varieties of
stochastic dominance usually neglected in standard literature.
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1 Introduction
Stochastic dominance as a way for partially ordering probability distributions was introduced in
economics and decision theory through some pioneering articles published from the 1960's on-
wards1 (Quirk and Saposnik 1962, Hadar and Russell 1969, Hanoch and Levy 1969, Rothschild
and Stiglitz 1970, Whitmore 1970) and spawned later an important body of literature. From
the very beginning, emphasis was laid on the equivalence between the attitude toward risk of a
decision maker expressed by various types of stochastic dominance, and corresponding classes of
utility functions, within an expected utility framework. Called congruence by Fishburn (1976),
this equivalence between a partial order, generated by stochastic dominance, and the intersection
between complete orders, generated by a class of utility functions, led to the powerful conclusion
that preference for a stochastically dominating distribution of such type might be represented by
any utility function belonging to a speciﬁc class; and, conversely, that a decision maker endowed
with any utility function from this class always prefers stochastically dominating distributions of
this type. However, no general formulation was given till now.
The ﬁrst results (Quirk and Saposnik 1962, Hadar and Russell 1969, Hanoch and Levy 1969,
Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) related ﬁrst degree stochastic dominance (FSD) to the class of non-
decreasing utility functions  that is, to functions whose ﬁrst derivative was non-negative  so that
∗PHARE, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and CNRS  106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital  75647 Paris
Cedex 13  France. E-mail: andre.lapidus@univ-paris1.fr
1The ﬁrst demonstrations on stochastic dominance appeared long before its introduction in economics. Le
Breton (1987) pointed out an alternative demonstration concerning second degree stochastic dominance when both
distributions have the same mean, published by Karamata as early as 1932.
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both risk-averse and risk-seeking decision makers preferred ﬁrst degree stochastically dominating
distributions2. In the last three papers (Hadar and Russell 1969, Hanoch and Levy 1969, Rothschild
and Stiglitz 1970), it was also shown that second degree stochastic dominance (SSD) was linked
to the class of non-decreasing concave utility functions  whose ﬁrst and second derivatives are
respectively positive and negative  which characterize risk-aversion for expected utility decision
makers. This result was extended to a more speciﬁc type of risk-aversion, taking skewness into
account, by Whitmore (1970), who linked third degree stochastic dominance (TSD) to the class of
non-decreasing concave utility functions with positive third derivative, provided the mean of the
dominating distribution was at least equal to that of the dominated one. Later on, such attitude
toward risk has been named prudence (Kimball 1990), and uniﬁed accounts of the three ﬁrst
degrees of stochastic dominance could be provided (see, for instance, Thorlund-Petersen 2001).
Again, the result on third degree stochastic dominance was generalized to n-th degree stochastic
dominance, which was related to utility functions whose odd and even derivatives are respectively
positive and negative, till the n-th degree (Fishburn 1976), therefore allowing a broader exploration
of these reﬁnements of the attitude toward risk involved similarly in higher degree stochastic
dominance and in the signing of higher degree derivatives of the utility function, like what was
called temperance (4th degree, after Kimball 1992) or edginess (5th degree, Lajeri-Chaherli
2004).
Symmetrically, characterizations of risk-seeking appeared some years later, giving rise to what
was to be called (in spite of an imperfectly ﬁxed vocabulary) inverse stochastic dominance3.
Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezendonck (1984) introduced second degree inverse stochastic dom-
inance (SISD), which amounts to what Levy (2006, pp. 126-130) called risk-seeking stochastic
dominance (RSSD), as related to the class of non-decreasing convex utility functions (with non-
negative ﬁrst and second derivatives). Like in the case of direct dominance, taking skewness into
account led to third degree inverse stochastic dominance, which was divided by Zaras (1989) be-
tween two types: third degree type 1 inverse stochastic dominance (TISD1), linked to the class
of convex utility functions with non-positive third derivative (Zaras 1989) therefore denoting im-
prudence; and third degree type 2 inverse stochastic dominance (TISD2), which also corresponds
to convex utility functions, but with non-negative third derivative (Goovaerts, De Vylder and
Haezendonck 1984) which might be interpreted as prudence, like for TSD4.
Since the pioneering works of the 1960's and 70's, the concept of stochastic dominance has
been subjected to several reﬁnements and extensions: quantile approach, introduction of riskless
assets, extension to the measure of inequalities, multicriteria decision, almost dominance or fuzzy
measures, consistency with non-expected utility theories like rank-dependent utility or cumulative
prospect theory, etc. . . A review of this literature can be found in Guo (2012), and in the books
by Sriboonchitta, Wong, Dhompongsa and Nguyen (2010) and by Levy (2006). But what seems to
have been the most salient evolution concerns the way the orders generated by stochastic dominance
2An intuitive knowledge of ﬁrst degree stochastic dominance in relation to decision seems to have been widely
spread long before the contributions of 1969 and 1970. As Pradier (2006) pointed out, Jacob Bernoulli, for instance,
argued as early as the very beginning of 18th century, in the fourth part of his Ars Conjectandi, that what may
be advantageous in one case, and can never harm, should be preferred [praeferendum est ] to what is in no case
beneﬁcial or harmful, and related this to popular wisdom expressed in a German saying, Hilﬀdt es nicht / so
schadt es nicht (Bernoulli 1713, p. 320).
3For instance, in a pioneering paper where they applied stochastic dominance to the question of of inequality
measures, Muliere and Scarsini (1989) named inverse stochastic dominance the integration of diﬀerences between
the inverses of cumulative distribution functions, F−1 and G−1, and not between decumulative functions.
4For a systematic account of risk attitudes involved in the signing of the various derivatives of the utility function,
see Eeckhout and Schlesinger 2006.
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were considered. The original approach leads to view stochastic dominance of various types as
generating possible partial preference preorders over a set of lotteries. This justiﬁes raising the
question of the congruence with a class of utility functions within a context of expected utility.
However, once the idea of congruence has been accepted in principle, attention seems to have shifted
toward the nature of the concept of stochastic dominance which allows the eﬃcient selection of a
lottery among a subset of lotteries, according to some utility functions belonging to the congruent
class. Typical of this appraoach is Post and Kopa (2013) paper, which allows for comparing a
given lottery with a discrete set of alternative lotteries, or with a set of linear combinations of
these lotteries, on the basis of a generalization of the concept of convex stochastic dominance,
which Fishburn introduced as early as 1974.
This paper goes a step back to the original approach, acknowledging that the question of
congruence has been solved only for the few cases noted above. It follows on from Fishburn's
solution, which concerned n-th degree direct stochastic dominance (Fishburn 1976) but gives up
this limitation to a speciﬁc type of stochastic dominance. Therefore, it ﬁrst provides a unifying
treatment, now permitting any type of stochastic dominance, direct or inverse, and of any degree, in
relation to classes of utility functions deﬁned by the signing of their successive derivatives (section
2). This allows giving general conditions of congruence, that is conditions for the representation
of each kind of stochastic dominance by a class of utility functions and reciprocally (section 3).
2 A formal framework
Denote X and Y two distinct random variables with support [a, b] ⊂ R. Assume that their respec-
tive distribution functions, F and G, are absolutely continuous, so that they can be represented
by their density of probability functions f and g5. Stochastic dominance of degree i (i = 1, ..., n)
of f over g (X over Y ) amounts to the non-positivity of an index of dominance for each value
of x on [a, b]. This index, which is said ﬁnal when i = n and intermediary otherwise, is the i-th
integral of f (x) − g (x), each step of integration being either from a to x  direct dominance 
or from x to b  inverse dominance. The situation usually favored in the literature, where each
step of integration from 1 to n is direct, will be termed hereafter complete direct dominance of
degree n. Symmetrically, in an expected utility framework, preference given to f over g amounts
to the non-negativity of the diﬀerence between expected utilities, Eu (f)− Eu (g), which depends
on the properties of a utility function u  assumed n-th diﬀerentiable  expressed in the signs of
its successive derivatives, u1 (x) , ...un (x).
The formal framework within which the relation between stochastic dominance and expected
utility is investigated results from the deﬁnitions of (1) the index and condition of stochastic
dominance; (2) the classes of utility functions and of resulting preferences according to expected
utility; and (3) a transformation procedure from the degrees of integration of the index of stochastic
dominance to the degrees of derivation of the corresponding utility function.
Deﬁnition 1. Stochastic dominance
Let A ⊆ [n], where [n] is the set of integers {1, ..., n}. Then:
5Usual regularities, like absolute continuity on a compact interval of R, are assumed throughout this paper for
the sake of simplicity, in order to escape possible complications (requiring the use of Riemann-Stieltjes or Lebesgue-
Stieltjes integrals) when Lebesgue's criterion for Riemann integrability does not hold for f and g. See the clariﬁcation
and restatement of the ﬁrst results of Hanoch and Levy (1969) and Hadar and Russell (1971) by Tesfatsion (1976).
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(i) The stochastic dominance index of degree i ∈ [n], denoted HiA,n (x) is deﬁned by6:
HiA,n (x) = 1A (i)
ˆ x
a
Hi−1A,n (y) dy + (1− 1A (i))
ˆ b
x
Hi−1A,n (y) dy(
with H0A,n (x) = f (x)− g (x)
)
.
This index is ﬁnal if i = n and intermediary if i < n.
(ii) Let fDA,ng denote the stochastic dominance of f over g at ﬁnal degree n, direct for all
degrees in A and inverse for all degrees not in A. The condition of stochastic dominance of f over
g is deﬁned as:
fDA,ng ⇔ ∀x ∈ [a, b], HnA,n (x) ≤ 0
(since the two random variables, X and Y, are distinct, f 6= g, and strict inequality holds for at
least one value of x).
Note. Throughout this paper, subscripts n or A in HiA,n are omitted when the context avoids
any misunderstanding.
Example 1. Assume [n] = {1, ...l, ...m, ...n} with 1, l, n ∈ A and m ∈ {[n]A (that is, to the
complement of A with respect to [n]). The dominance index of ﬁnal degree n and of intermediate
degrees 1, l,m results from repeated integrations of f (x)−g (x), where the ﬁrst integration is from
a to x1, the l-th from a to xl, the m-th from xm to b, and the n-th from a to x:
Hn{1,...l,...n} (x) =
ˆ x
a
...
[ˆ b
xm
...
[ˆ xl
a
...
[ˆ x1
a
(f (y)− g (y)) dy
]
...dxl−1
]
...dxm−1
]
...dxn−1.
If Hn (x) ≤ 0 for each value of x on [a, b], f is said to dominate stochastically g, directly at ﬁnal
degree n and at intermediary degrees 1 and l, and inversely at intermediary degree m.
Remark 1. Let A(i) and A\(i) be identical subsets of [n], except that i belongs to A(i) and not to
A\(i). By construction, the following properties always hold:
HiA(i) (a) = H
i
A\(i) (b) = 0 (a)
HiA(i) (b) = H
i
A\(i) (a) (b)
HiA(i) (x) = H
i
A\(i) (a)−HiA\(i) (x) (c)
HiA\(i) (x) = H
i
A(i)
(b)−HiA(i) (x) (d)
HiA(1) (x) = −HiA\(1) (x) (e)
Remark 2. Standard literature often favors situations of complete direct stochastic dominance,
where the complementary of A, {[n]A, is empty. For instance: ﬁrst (FSD), second (SSD), third
(TSD) and n-th (NSD) degree stochastic dominance respectively correspond to conﬁgurations
where the bipartitions of [n] are respectively such that
(
A, {[1]A
)
= ({1} , ∅), (A, {[2]A) = ({1, 2} , ∅),(
A, {[3]A
)
= ({1, 2, 3} , ∅) and (A, {[n]A) = ({1, ...n} , ∅). The possibility that {[n]A be not empty
(that is, that f stochastically dominates g inversely at some intermediary or ﬁnal degree) is typ-
ically dealt with in order to explore risk-seeking, through either second degree inverse stochastic
6Recall that the indicator function 1A in Deﬁnition 1 is an application from [n] to {0, 1} which, for i ∈ [n], yields
1 if i belongs to A, and 0 if it does not.
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dominance (SISD or RSSD - risk-seeking stochastic dominance), where
(
A, {[2]A
)
= ({1} , {2} ),
or third degree inverse stochastic dominance, either of type 1 (TSID1) when the third integration
is from a to x so that
(
A, {[3]A
)
= ({1, 3} , {2} ), or of type 2 (TISD2) when the third integration
is from x to b so that
(
A, {[3]A
)
= ({1} , {2, 3} ).
The construction of relevant classes of n-diﬀerentiable utility functions u deﬁned on [a, b] obeys
the same principles as those which have governed the construction of an index of stochastic dom-
inance. The starting point is the identiﬁcation of the sets of degrees of derivation of a utility
function, corresponding to either positive or negative derivatives.
Deﬁnition 2. Utility
Let B ⊆ [n]. Then:
(i) Deﬁne a set UB,n of n-diﬀerentiable utility functions as:
UB,n =
{
u : [a, b]→ R such that ∀i ∈ B, ∀x ∈ [a, b] , ui (x) ≥ 0 and ∀i ∈ {[n]B, ∀x ∈ [a, b] ,
ui (x) ≤ 0}
(with for all i, strict inequalities for at least one x).
(ii) Following the expected utility approach, all decision makers whose utility function belongs
to UB,n are said to prefer f to g when for each of them, the expected value of the utility of f is
not smaller than that of g. Their common preference is denoted fRB,ng:
fRB,ng ⇔ ∀u ∈ UB,n, Eu (f)− Eu (g) ≥ 0.
Remark 3. The signing of the derivatives of the utility function is usually linked to some typical
attitudes toward risk through the ranking of random variables according to their expected utility.
For instance, it is well-known that increasing utility functions (1 ∈ B) characterize decision-makers
with monotonous increasing preferences, whatever their attitude toward risk. When 2 ∈ {[n]B,
the decision-maker is risk-averse and, conversely, he or she is risk-seeking when 2 ∈ B. The
intuitive meaning of 3 ∈ B is this of prudence (Kimball 1990), so that 3 ∈ {[n]B corresponds
to imprudence. Higher degrees of derivation are not that easy to interpret. However, 4 ∈ {[n]B
and 4 ∈ B are currently viewed as, respectively, temperance (Kimball 1992) and intemperance.
Similarly, 5 ∈ B and 5 ∈ {[n]B correspond to edginess (Lajeri-Chaherli 2004) and to what might
be called calmness. Typical utility functions like the logarithmic ones, which give rise to monotone
increasing preferences, risk-aversion, prudence, temperance, edginess and so on, are characterized
by alternatively positive and negative derivatives, and were sometimes called mixed risk averse
utility functions (Caballé and Pomansky, 1996): B = {1, 3, ...} and {[n]B = {2, 4, ...}). Eeckhoudt
and Schlessinger (2006) have shown the equivalence between such higher order risk attitudes and
preferences over particular classes of lottery pairs, involving zero-mean independent noise random
variables.
The relation between stochastic dominance and expected utility is taken up through a relation
between two elements A and B of the powerset of [n] . Consider the Procedure AB hereafter, which
allocates i (i = 1, ..., n) between B and {[n]B as a degree of derivation, according to its belonging,
as a degree of integration, to A or {[n]A, and to the belonging of i− 1 to B or {[n]B:
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Procedure AB
• For all i ∈ Aif i− 1 ∈ B, then i ∈ {[n]Bif i− 1 ∈ {[n]B or i = 1, then i ∈ B
• For all i ∈ {[n]Aif i− 1 ∈ {[n]B or i = 1, then i ∈ {[n]Bif i− 1 ∈ B, then i ∈ B
Deﬁnition 3. Transformation
The transformation of i = 1, ..., n, as degrees of integration belonging to either A or {[n]A, into
degrees of derivation belonging to either B or {[n]B, is performed by
φ : 2[n] → 2[n], A 7→ φ (A) = B (1)
3 Congruence between stochastic dominance and expected
utility
The issue is now that of the conditions of consistency between two partial orders: according to
stochastic dominance, DA,n, and to expected utility, RB,n. Though presented diﬀerently, such
consistency was called congruence by P. Fishburn (1976, p. 303):
Deﬁnition 4. Congruence
A stochastic dominance order DA,n and an expected utility order RB,n are congruent when, for
each f and g,
fDA,ng ⇔ fRB,ng.
It will be shown (Proposition 1) that, provided additional conditions on the bounds of the
distributions are satisﬁed, congruence is achieved when B is the image of A through the transfor-
mation φ deﬁned in (1). The structure of the relation between the orders generated by stochastic
dominance and expected utility is further investigated in Proposition 2.
The following lemma shows that each possible allocation of the degrees of integration corre-
sponds through φ to an allocation of the degrees of derivation, and reciprocally:
Lemma 1. ∀A ∈ 2[n],∃B ∈ 2[n] : B = φ (A)
and ∀B ∈ 2[n],∃A ∈ 2[n] : B = φ (A).
Proof. Check with Procedure AB that φ in (1) is a bijection of 2[n] into itself.
A general condition for congruence between stochastic dominance and expected utility orders
is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For all A,B ∈ 2[n] such that B = φ (A), the two following propositions are
equivalent for all f and g:
1. fRB,ng (expected utility).
2. fDA,ng (stochastic dominance)
6
Stochastic Dominance of Any Type and Any Degree, and Expected Utility
and, if n ≥ 3, for all i = 2, ..., n− 1:
HiA,n (γi) ≤ 0 (where γi = 1A (i) b+ (1− 1A (i)) a) (conditions on upper or lower bounds).
Proof. See Appendix.
An intuitive interpretation of Proposition 1 is that provided conditions on bounds are satisﬁed,
the partial order on random variables generated by any type of stochastic dominance, say DA,n,
is identical to the intersection between all the complete preference preorders on random variables
underlying all the possible utility functions belonging to UB,n, when B = φ (A). Proposition 1 may
also be viewed as establishing a link between subjective assessments and objective properties. It
means that on the one hand, what all possible decision makers, characterized by a utility function
from the same class, have in common evidently rests on their respective subjective preferences;
but, on the other hand, this common ranking of random variables may alternatively be viewed as
model-free, that is, as depending only on some objective properties of the distribution functions
expressed in stochastic dominance.
We know that in the case of complete direct n-th degree stochastic dominance, the conditions
on upper bounds can be viewed as algebraic combinations of the diﬀerences between the successive
moments around zero of the distributions (Jean and Helms 1988). A typical illustration, anticipated
by Whitmore (1970), is that in order to have congruence between complete direct third degree
stochastic dominance (A = {1, 2, 3}) and the class of increasing concave utility functions with a non-
negative third derivative (B = {1, 3}), the diﬀerence between means (ﬁrst moments), E (f)−E (g),
had to be non-negative7. The conclusion of Jean and Helms (1988) still holds in the case of
Proposition 1 where dominance is not necessarily direct at each step since, by construction, the
value of any index of dominance at the relevant bound is itself an algebraic sum of some complete
direct dominance indices of equal and smaller degrees at the upper bound: any index of degree
i at the relevant bound is therefore a linear combination of the diﬀerences between the moments
around zero jMf (0)− jMg (0) of all degrees j from 1 to i− 1.
Example 2. Usual and neglected types of stochastic dominance in relation to expected
utility
Such representation of congruence allows ﬁnding again the usual formulations of stochastic
dominance from the end of the 1960's to the 1980's, and their correspondence with certain classes
of utility functions. In return, it also allows ﬁnding the neglected or missing categories which can
now be put to the fore.
This bringing together is obvious in the case of complete direct dominance in the following
usual cases, An and Bn denoting elements of the powerset 2
[n]:
FSD (ﬁrst degree stochastic dominance: Quirk and Saposnik 1962 (discrete case); Hadar
and Russell 1969; Hanoch and Levy 1969) corresponds to A1 = {1}. It was acknowledged
congruent with
B1 = φ ({1}) = {1}
that is with monotonous non-decreasing preferences, entailing universal preference for the
dominating random variable, whatever the decision maker's attitude toward risk.
7Recall that E (f)− E (g) ≥ 0 is already a consequence of complete direct stochastic dominance at degrees 1 or
2.
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SSD (second degree stochastic dominance: Hadar and Russell 1969; Hanoch and Levy 1969;
Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970 (mean preserving spread subcase  MPS)) corresponds to
A2 = {1, 2}, and was acknowledged congruent with
B2 = φ ({1, 2}) = {1}
that is with monotonous non-decreasing preferences and risk-aversion.
TSD (third degree stochastic dominance: Whitmore 1970) corresponds to A3 = {1, 2, 3},
and was acknowledged congruent with
B3 = φ ({1, 2, 3}) = {1, 3}
that is with monotonous non-decreasing preferences, risk-aversion, positive skewness-seeking
and negative skewness-aversion (typically, a decision maker interested in insuring his or her
house, and in buying public lotteries tickets). This corresponds to what is usually called
prudence since Kimball (1990)'s paper, in relation to the positive sign of the third derivative
of the utility function.
NSD (n-th degree stochastic dominance: Fishburn 1976) corresponds to complete direct
stochastic dominance with An = [n] = {1, 2, 3...n} and was acknowledged congruent with
Bn = φ ({1, 2, 3, ...n}) = {1, 3, ...}
that is, with a class of utility functions whose odd and even derivatives are respectively
non-negative and non-positive.
The same bringing together is a bit less immediate in the cases of stochastic dominance of degrees
2 and 3, related to monotonous non-decreasing preferences and risk-seeking, from the point of view
of expected utility. These diﬀerent cases were usually called inverse stochastic dominance (see,
for example, Zaras 1989), and have in common that 2 /∈ An. A technical but simple problem of
presentation arises from the fact that the corresponding indices of stochastic dominance generally
relied on decumulative distribution functions, of type F (x) =
´ b
x
f (y) dy, instead of cumulative
functions F (x) =
´ x
a
f (y) dy. The resulting successive integrals were therefore computed on the
basis of H1∅,1 (x), instead of H
1
{1},1 (x), although the concerned decision makers were endowed with
non-decreasing preferences. Nonetheless, since H1∅,1 (x) = −H1{1},1 (x), any higher degree of the
intermediary or ﬁnal index is such that, assuming that 1 is an element of An, H
i
An\{1},n (x) =
−HiAn,n (x) (see Remark 1 on Deﬁnition 1). So that the non-positivity requirement for the index
of stochastic dominance was usually replaced by a non-negativity condition insofar as it was applied
to inverse dominance at intermediate or ﬁnal degree 2. Taking this into account allows establishing
the following three correspondences:
SISD (second degree inverse stochastic dominance: Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezendonck
1984) or RSSD (risk-seeking stochastic dominance: Levy 2006) corresponds to A2 = {1},
and was acknowledged congruent with
B2 = φ ({1}) = {1, 2}
that is, with monotonous non-decreasing preferences and risk-seeking.
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TISD1 (third degree type 1 inverse stochastic dominance: Zaras 1989) corresponds to A3 =
{1, 3} and was acknowledged congruent with
B3 = φ ({1, 3}) = {1, 2}
that is, with monotonous non-decreasing preferences, risk-seeking, positive skewness-aversion
and negative skewness-seeking (imprudence).
TISD2 (third degree type 2 inverse stochastic dominance: Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezen-
donck 1984) corresponds to A3 = {1} and was acknowledged congruent with
B3 = φ ({1}) = {1, 2, 3}
that is, with monotonous non-decreasing preferences, risk-seeking, positive skewness-seeking
and negative skewness-aversion (prudence).
However, the three following instances of stochastic dominance are still missing in current literature,
and are worth being noted.
1. The ﬁrst instance is that of situations in which a decision maker would prefer the distribu-
tion whose probability to get at least this income is the smaller that is, the stochastically
dominating random variable at degree 1 when A1 = ∅:
FISD (stochastic dominance inverse for the degree 1). A1 = ∅. This amounts to congruence
with
B1 = φ (∅) = ∅
that is with non-increasing utility functions. Of course, such situations might seem of little
practical interest  except in case the purpose were to consider the behavior toward risk of
a decision maker whose objective would be to ruin himself or herself. However, it makes
clear that, contrary to a hasty conclusion, though preference for distributions which are
stochastically directly dominated at degree 1 by other distributions might seem a bit strange,
it is by no way constitutively irrational.
2. But it is also obvious that, by contrast to TSD which has been extensively studied after
Whitmore's 1970 paper, in relation to the more familiar idea of DARA (decreasing absolute
risk aversion), a second type of third stochastic dominance TSD2, homologous to TISD2,
doesn't seem to have aroused special interest:
TSD2 (third degree stochastic dominance, type 2) corresponds to A3 = {1, 2}. According
to Proposition 1, granted that third degree conditions on bounds are satisﬁed, TSD2 is
congruent with
B3 = φ ({1, 2}) = {1}
that is, with monotonous non-decreasing preferences, risk-aversion, positive skewness-aversion
and negative skewness-seeking  which amounts to imprudence. After all, we all know people
who dislike risk, never buy public lotteries tickets, and nonetheless would reject the idea of
insuring their house if they were not legally obliged to subscribe to an insurance contract.
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3. Finally, whereas complete direct stochastic dominance of any degree n (NSD, where An =
{1, ..., n}) has been regularly taken up after Fishburn's 1976 paper (see, for instance, Levy
2006, pp. 131-132), such was not the case for stochastic dominance direct or indirect at any
intermediary degree i or ﬁnal degree n, that is, when An is any element of 2
[n]. Filling this
gap was the main purpose of this article.
Remark 4. Stochastic dominance orders and classes of utility functions
According to a well-known suﬃcient rule of stochastic dominance orders, if f stochastically
dominates g at degree k, it also dominates g at degrees k+1, k+2, ... (see, for instance, Levy 2006,
pp. 119-20, for the relations between complete direct dominances of degrees 1, 2 and 3). Typically,
this means that risk-averse and risk-seeking decision makers with positive monotone preferences
might disagree on the order between random variables not ordered by ﬁrst degree direct stochastic
dominance, but that they agree on the order of random variables generated by the latter, which is
consistent with both direct and inverse stochastic dominance of degree 2. This result can be easily
generalized and related to preferences according to expected utility in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let m and n be two integers such that m ≤ n. If Am, Bm ∈ 2[m] and An, Bn ∈ 2[n]
satisfy (a) and (b):
(a) Bm = φ (Am), and Bn = φ (An)
(b) Am ⊆ An, {[m]Am ⊆ {[n]An or Bm ⊆ Bn, {[m]Bm ⊆ {[n]Bn
then:
1. DAm,m ⊆ DAn,n
2. UBn,n ⊆ UBm,m
(By abuse of notation, DAm,m and DAn,n stand for the set-equivalents of the corresponding binary
relations).
Proof. First note that, in reason of the deﬁnition of φ by (1), the two alternative conditions in (b)
are equivalent: Am ⊆ An, {[m]Am ⊆ {[n]An ⇔ Bm ⊆ Bn, {[m]Bm ⊆ {[n]Bn
1. Obvious, since Hm (x) ≤ 0 for each x over [a, b] so that its integral, either from a to x, or
from x to b, Hm+1 (x) ≤ 0, and so on till Hn (x). As a result, fDAm,mg ⇒ fDAn,ng.
2. Observe that, since Bm ⊆ Bn and {[m]Bm ⊆ {[n]Bn, u ∈ UBn,n ⇒ u ∈ UBm,m.
Bringing together the two parts of Proposition 2 shows the structure of the relation between
the two partial orders generated either by stochastic dominance, or by expected utility. At the
ﬁnal stage, Proposition 1 makes clear that when conditions on bounds are satisﬁed, they lead to
the same result: DAm,m and RBm,m order the same random variables (that is, DAm,m = RBm,m),
just like DAn,n and RBn,n (that is, DAn,n = RBn,n) and it can be concluded from Proposition 2
(1.) that their set is expanding from m to n. However, Proposition 2 (2.) shows that the same
conclusion is obtained diﬀerently from the expected utility point of view. Moving from m to n ﬁrst
generates a contraction: for instance, such utility function, which was included in UBm,m does not
belong any more to UBn,n, because of the signs of its derivatives from m + 1 to n. But since the
resulting partial order R is the intersection between the complete orders underlying each utility
functions belonging to U , R depends on less complete orders when moving from m to n. So that
it is expanding from RBm,m to RBn,n, whereas U is contracting from UBm,m to UBn,n.
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4 Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper was to set out a framework for analyzing the relations between subjective
preferences between random variables founded on speciﬁc classes of utility functions, and the model-
free, objective proprieties, of the probability distributions of these random variables expressed in
corresponding types of stochastic dominance. This framework ﬁrst consists in the construction of an
index of stochastic dominance, which allows either direct or inverse dominance at any intermediate
or ﬁnal degree. A proposition is demonstrated which establishes the conditions of congruence
(in the sense of Fishburn 1976) between the orderings generated by stochastic dominance and by
classes of utility functions, extending the results of the pioneering works of Hadar and Russell
(1969), Henoch and Levy (1969), Whitmore (1970), Fishburn (1976), Goovaerts, De Vylder and
Haezendonck (1984) and Zaras (1989). Comparison with previous contributions also leads to the
identiﬁcation of neglected kinds of stochastic dominance, like a third degree type 2 stochastic
dominance (TSD2) and the congruent class of utility functions.
Appendix: Congruence between stochastic dominance and ex-
pected utility (Proposition (1))
A Preliminaries concerning the construction of the expression of Eu (f)−
Eu (g)
[At least till equation (2), this sub-section can be skipped by the readers familiar with the technique
of demonstration already used in most pioneering papers since Hadar and Russell (1969) or Hanoch
and Levy (1969)]
The proof of Proposition 1 follows readily from the repeated integration by parts until degree
n of Eu (f) − Eu (g) =
´ b
a
u (x) (f (x)− g (x)) dx = ´ b
a
u (x)H0A,n (x) dx, the non-negativity of
Eu (f) − Eu (g) for all u ∈ UB,n being equivalent to fRB,ng. The result is quite classical, except
that at each step of integration, it has to be given according to the belonging of i to either A or
{[n]A - which draws on Remark 1 (a)-(e). Starting from the ﬁrst degree of integration gives:
• Degree 1:
Eu (f)− Eu (g) =
ˆ b
a
u (x)H0A (x) dx

1 ∈ A :
=
[
u (x)H1A (x)
]b
a
− ´ b
a
u1 (x)H
1
A (x) dx
= − ´ b
a
u1 (x)H
1
A (x) dx
1 ∈ {[n]A :
= − [u (x)H1A (x)]ba + ´ ba u1 (x)H1A (x) dx
=
´ b
a
u1 (x)H
1
A (x) dx.
Note that the sign before the integrals in the right-hand side of the equations is negative when 1
belongs to A, and positive when it does not.
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• Degree 2:
Eu (f)−Eu (g)

1 ∈ A :
= − ´ b
a
u1 (x)H
1
A (x) dx
= − [u1 (x)H2A (x)]ba + ´ ba u2 (x)H2A (x) dx

2 ∈ A :
= −u1 (b)H2A (b)
+
´ b
a
u2 (x)H
2
A
(x) dx
2 ∈ {[n]A :
= −u1 (a)H2A (a)
− ´ b
a
u2 (x)H
2
A
(x) dx
1 ∈ {[n]A :
=
´ b
a
u1 (x)H
1
A (x) dx
=
[
u1 (x)H
2
A
(x)
]b
a
− ´ b
a
u2 (x)H
2
A
(x) dx

2 ∈ A :
= u1 (b)H
2
A
(b)
− ´ b
a
u2 (x)H
2
A
(x) dx
2 ∈ {[n]A :
= u1 (a)H
2
A
(a)
+
´ b
a
u2 (x)H
2
A
(x) dx.
To sum up, the sign before the integral of u2 (x)H
2
A
(x) in the right-hand side of each equation is
positive when 2 is in A and when, at degree 1, the sign before the integral of u1 (x)H
1
A (x) in the
right-hand side is negative; or when 2 is not A and when, at degree 1, the sign before the integral
of u1 (x)H
1
A (x) in the right-hand side is positive. Conversely, it is negative when 2 is not A and
when, at degree 1, the sign before the integral of u1 (x)H
1
A (x) in the right-hand side is negative; or
when 2 is in A and when, at degree 1, the sign before the integral of u1 (x)H
1
A (x) in the right-hand
side is positive. On the other hand, the sign before u1 (γ2)H
2
A (γ2), - where γ2 equals a or b - still
in the right-hand side of each equation, is positive when at degree 1, the sign before the integral
of u1 (x)H
1
A (x) in the right-hand side is itself positive, and it is negative otherwise.
Carrying on till degree n yields:
• Degree n:
Eu (f)− Eu (g) =
n∑
i=2
sgn (i− 1)ui−1 (γi)HiA,n (γi) + sgn (n)
ˆ b
a
un (x)H
n
A,n (x) dx
(2)
where for all i ∈ [n] , sgn (i) = 1− 21C (i) .
The set C ∈ 2[n] is the outcome of Procedure AC hereafter, which allocates each i to either
C or {[n]C and, therefore, determines the values of sgn (n) and sgn (i− 1) in (2).
Procedure AC
• For all i ∈ A
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if i− 1 ∈ C, then i ∈ {[n]Cif i− 1 ∈ {[n]C or i = 1, then i ∈ C
• For all i ∈ {[n]Aif i− 1 ∈ {[n]C or i = 1, then i ∈ {[n]Cif i− 1 ∈ C, then i ∈ C
B Proof of Proposition 1
In an expected utility framework, fRB,ng is equivalent to the non-negativity of Eu (f)−Eu (g) for
all u ∈ UB,n, as given in (2).
Note that Procedure AB and Procedure AC above are identical, C in AC standing for B in
AB, so that B = C. An immediate consequence is that in (2), the signs of sgn (i− 1) and ui−1 (x),
as well as those of sgn (n) and un (x), are always opposite.
Suﬃciency :
fDA,ng
and, if n ≥ 3,
for all i = 2, ...n− 1 :
HiA,n (γi) ≤ 0
⇒ fRB,ng.
By hypothesis, when n ≥ 3, for all i between 2 and n1, HiA,n (γi) ≤ 0 on the right-hand-side
of (2). Still by hypothesis, HnA,n (x) ≤ 0 for all x on [a, b] - which also means that at the particular
value γn, H
n
A,n (γn) ≤ 0.
Since the signs of sgn (i) and ui (x) are always opposite for all u ∈ UB,n,
∑n
i=2 sgn (i− 1)ui−1 (γi)
HiA,n (γi) ≥ 0. In the same way, sgn (n)
´ b
a
un (x)H
n
A,n (x) dx ≥ 0, on the right-hand-side of (2).
And since the whole right-hand-side of (2) is non-negative, Eu (f) − Eu (g) ≥ 0 for all u ∈ UB,n,
which amounts to fRB,ng.
Necessity :
fRB,ng ⇒

fDA,ng
and, if n ≥ 3,
for all i = 2, ...n− 1 :
HiA,n (γi) ≤ 0.
Assume there exists y such that HnA,n (y) > 0. As a result, since the signs of sgn (n) and
un (y) are always opposite, if n ∈ B (resp., n ∈ [n] (B)), a suﬃciently high (resp., low) value of
un (y) would allow the right-hand-side of (2) to become negative. And, since Eu (f)−Eu (g) would
become negative, this would contradict the assumption that fRB,ng. One concludes that such
value y does not exist, so that, for all x on [a, b], HnA,n (x) ≤ 0, which means that fDA,ng.
Since this non-positivity of HnA,n (x) also holds for the the upper and lower bounds of x, and
consequently for γn, H
n
A,n (γn) ≤ 0 in (2).
Let us turn, now, to the left-hand part of the right-hand-side of (2), i.e.,
∑n
i=2 sgn (i− 1)
ui−1 (γi)HiA,n (γi). Note that this left-hand part only exists when n ≥ 2, and that we have just
shown that it is non-negative for n = 2, since HnA,n (γn) ≤ 0.
Focusing on the cases when n ≥ 3, imagine that there exists a value k of i (2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1)
for which γk would lead to H
k
A,n (γk) > 0. Here again, a high enough absolute value of uk−1 (γk)
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would allow the right-hand-side of (2) to become negative, contradicting the non-negativity of
Eu (f)−Eu (g) for each u ∈ UB,n, which amounts to fRB,ng. Hence, such value k does not exist,
and HiA,n (γi) ≤ 0 for all i included between 2 and n1. 2
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